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Non-technical summary
This paper integrates two major research areas -the analysis of external imbalances and studies of the geographical determinants of cross-border investment.
By focusing on the net external position and its long-term determinants such as GDP per capita, the demographic structure, and the level of public debt, we analyse why countries are persistent net creditors or net debtors. In particular, we investigate if the geographic location of a country has an impact on the ability to raise external funding. To this end, we modify various concepts of the bilateral asset trade literature and test their relevance for the net external position.
Based on the idea of increasing financial intermediation costs with distance, we use a unilateral concept of distance, namely international financial remoteness as introduced by Rose and Spiegel (2009) .
In addition, we employ further concepts from the bilateral asset trade literature in a unilateral framework. Starting from bilateral datasets, we construct composite measures of -for instance -financial openness of neighbour countries or fellow currency union countries and test their relevance for a country's net external position.
Countries might also be able to participate in world financial or goods markets by being integrated with a 'core' country. This notion, dating back to Baumol (1986) , postulates that specific convergence clubs of a core (leader) and a periphery (converging countries) exhibit spillovers from the core to the periphery via extensive trade and financial linkages. We apply the concepts of bilateral financial and trade linkages by identifying a core country and the level of integration with this core country for each economy in our sample and investigate if integration with the core has an impact on net external funding.
Our findings show that geography matters: controlling for standard determinants of net external positions, financially-remote countries exhibit robustly more positive net external positions. This hints at difficulties to receive net external funding for countries that are more 'remote' from major creditor countries and financial centres. This finding is even stronger for a subsample of emerging and developing countries.
Being located near financially very open countries, being in currency unions with creditor countries, or being highly integrated through financial and trade linkages with a 'core' country facilitates net external borrowing. Consequently, evidence is found for an important role of geographic and bilateral factors for a country's net external wealth.
Moreover we find an asymmetry in the way foreign asset and foreign liability positions are affected by financial remoteness. Financially-remote countries are able to overcome remoteness with regard to investing overseas, whereas inward investments are negatively influenced by a remote geographic location. We attribute this net funding problem to the positive correlation between distance and informational asymmetries as well as limited access to international financial markets.
Introduction
This paper integrates two major research areas -the analysis of external imbalances and studies of the geographical determinants of cross-border investment. We investigate if a country's geographical location affects its ability to raise net external funding.
The net external position of a country is an important steady-state variable which is crucial in order to understand short-term capital flows. As shown by Milesi-Ferretti (2001a 2001b , and 2002), long-term fundamentals such as GDP per capita, the demographic structure, the level of public debt, and country size are important determinants in explaining the level of a country's net external position. These fundamentals help explain why countries are persistent net creditors or net debtors. Theoretically, net external positions ensure that capital is allocated to the most productive nations. Moreover, intertemporal consumption smoothing works through this channel internationally. 1 The role of geographical and bilateral factors for a country's net external position is largely unexplored. In the literature on bilateral asset trade, it is well established that geography matters. For example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Portes and Rey (2005) show that bilateral distance and other proxies for informational asymmetries such as common language, colonial ties, and currency unions are crucial in explaining bilateral asset holdings and flows, respectively. Daude and Stein (2007) find that the difference in time zones is also important for bilateral (foreign direct) investments. Thus, asset trade can be explained by gravity models that are very similar to models of bilateral trade, implying a home bias or rather a proximity bias.
There is evidence for a proximity bias in the financial sector due to differences in access to financial services and information asymmetries that are increasing in distance. Moskowitz (1999, 2001) show that returns of fund managers in the United States are higher from investing in firms in close proximity. Also financial analysts tend to be more accurate in their assessments the closer they are located to a firm (Malloy, 2005) . Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that borrower quality increases with distance, as banks are unwilling to lend at great distances to problem borrowers whose loans would require more active monitoring. 2 We build on the literature above by investigating how geographic and bilateral factors influence the net external position of a country. The determinants of bilateral holdings can affect gross aggregate positions: as we expect a financially-remote country to be less integrated with the rest of the world, it might receive less inward capital flows which could translate into problems in generating net external funding.
1 The net external position of the United States has been analysed in-depth over the last years. Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Habib (2010) , among others, find evidence for an 'exorbitant privilege' of the United States by running sizeable excess returns on its net external position before the crisis period. This goes along with a net foreign asset position that is less negative than suggested by the current account deficits of the United States.
2 However, for example Huberman (2001) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) propose that proximate investments can be better explained by a behavioural familiarity bias rather than by informational asymmetries.
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Based on the idea of increasing financial intermediation costs with distance, Rose and Spiegel (2009) introduce a unilateral concept of distance, namely international financial remoteness.
They find that countries that are remote from financial activity (defined by the closest distance to one of the world's major financial centres -London, New York, and Tokyo) are systemically more volatile in terms of output and consumption growth. We use a similar concept in order to obtain remoteness measures for each country, namely the minimum distance and minimum time zone difference to one of the eight largest creditor countries that are consequently the major providers of external funding. We include these financial remoteness measures in standard net external position estimations.
Going beyond measures of distance there are more bilateral concepts potentially affecting net external positions. As we carry out our analysis in a unilateral framework, we apply Baicker's (2005) notion of neighbourliness which she uses to examine spillovers of fiscal policy among US states. We apply her idea of geographic contiguity and use further concepts from the bilateral asset trade literature in a unilateral framework. Starting from bilateral datasets, we construct composite measures of -for instance -financial openness of neighbour countries and test their relevance for the net external position.
The theoretical framework of this paper is shaped by the models of Obstfeld and Rogoff The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 theoretical issues are raised, followed by the empirical strategy in Section 3. The empirical results are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. Put differently, financial remoteness functions as an asymmetric tax that is levied on the return on foreign liabilities, but not on the return on foreign assets. Consequently, the foreign asset accumulation is not (or only to a lesser extent) distorted by financial remoteness, whereas foreign liabilities are subject to a 'remoteness' tax.
For a small open economy this asymmetry results in a more positive net external position (hence a lower, less negative, net foreign liability position). For remote countries that seek net external funding based on their macroeconomic fundamentals, a disadvantageous geographic location can thus be an impediment to achieving the desired net external position.
We test this formally by including variables from the bilateral concepts of financial remoteness, neighbourliness, and convergence clubs in the net external position estimations framework.
April 2011 3 Empirical Strategy
Specification
The empirical framework focuses on a static long-run relation using a cross-sectional approach.
We include the net external position (as a ratio to GDP) as an average over the period of 
where Bilateral i represents various bilateral concepts. Specifically, we include international fi- We use both the full sample of 149 countries, as well as a narrow sample of 119 countries that excludes the 30 most advanced countries (in terms of GDP per capita) as we expect differences in the way the bilateral concepts affect net external funding based on the stage of development of an economy. 3 Conceptually, less advanced countries might be more reliant on external funding in order to facilitate investments that lead to higher economic growth and convergence with the group of advanced countries. For the group of advanced countries, we expect this relation to be less pronounced. First, these countries are more likely to be well-integrated into the world economy, hence raising external capital should be less difficult even for remote advanced countries. 4 Second, given that these countries have reached a high level of economic development, Less advanced countries are expected to be 'natural' net debtor countries that are in need of downhill international capital flows. Given the theoretical considerations presented in Section 2, international financial remoteness might be a severe impediment to receiving the desired level of net external funding for this group of countries.
Control Variables
We build our empirical specifications on previous work by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti Furthermore, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) show that demography is a very important determinant of net external positions. We employ the entire age distribution in our empirical work as proposed by Fair and Dominguez (1991) and Higgins (1998) . This is crucial, as for instance, a relatively young workforce may be associated with relatively low savings and high investments whereas an older workforce may be associated with a rise in the net foreign asset position, as saving for retirement becomes more urgent and domestic investment falls. Countries with a high age-dependency ratio might start accumulating overseas assets to generate international investment income. A high youth dependency ratio may be associated with a high investment rate (to finance social infrastructure investments). Consequently, we follow Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2002) and use the entire age distribution of a country in order to account for the different demographic channels. We restrict the coefficients on the population share variables to lie along a cubic polynomial, so that only three composite demographic variables are entered into the regression specification (see Appendix A2 for details).
hypothesis of rich countries being less affected by financial remoteness. As a robustness check we also include Australia and New Zealand in the less advanced sample (based on their large net foreign liability positions), but find the results of the empirical analysis to hold nonetheless.
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April 2011 We also consider the level of public debt. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) find a significant negative coefficient on the level of public debt for developing countries. This non-Ricardian behaviour implies that higher levels of public debt are not fully offset by an increase in private asset accumulation. 5 Hence, more public debt might be associated with a decline in the net external position.
In addition, we control for country size by including the natural logarithm of population, as a large country may be more diversified and hence faces less external risk than a smaller country.
Also larger countries might be more likely to set up a stock market or attract the interest of international investors.
As additional variables, we use de-facto (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007 ) and de-jure (Chinn and Ito, 2008) international financial integration. These variables might be associated with easier access to external funding, thus lower net external positions. 6
Bilateral Concepts for Financial Remoteness

International Financial Remoteness
The concept of international financial remoteness was introduced by Rose and Spiegel (2009).
They use the natural logarithm of the distance to the closest financial centre (London, New
York, and Tokyo) as their prime measure of remoteness. these two remoteness measures (both as distance and time zone difference) is to find a proxy for aggregate 'access' to foreign funds and to account for informational asymmetries that are positively related to remoteness.
As an additional robustness check, we weight the distances to the eight largest creditor countries by the inverse of the share of the investments actually received from these countries.
Using data from the IMF's Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) on total portfolio investment positions, we construct the share of investments made by the eight largest creditor countries. Thus instead of using an unweighted distance measure, we employ:
where T A ji are the portfolio investments 'Top-8' creditor country j invests in host country i, and
T A ki are the total portfolio investments held by foreign investors in country i. We weight by the inverse of the share as the distance to a country which invests a large amount in host country i should receive a lower value than the distance to a country that invests only little in the host country. To illustrate, if the distance from country A to both country B and country C amounts to 1,000 km, but 50% of the foreign portfolio liabilities of country A are held by country B and only 10% by country C, the weighted distance to country B amounts to 2,000 km, whereas the distance to country C is 10,000 km. The rationale behind this weighting is to adjust the concept of international financial remoteness for actual investments such that actual remoteness is relatively smaller or larger than indicated by the unweighted distance term.
Given the theoretical considerations of Section 2, we expect a positive coefficient on the remoteness variables in specification (1) as the ease of net external funding should be decreasing with distance to the largest creditor countries.
In order to illustrate the concept of international financial remoteness we present the fifteen most and least remote countries in Table 1 : based on the minimum distance to the eight largest gross creditor countries, we find New Zealand to be the most remote country, followed by Mauritius and Japan. The least remote countries are all European-based with Belgium and the Czech Republic being the closest countries to one of the eight largest gross creditor countries.
The histogram in Figure 1 , shows the distribution of this remoteness measure for our sample.
About two thirds of the sample exhibit a minimum log distance of eight or higher (which is equivalent to 3,000 km) to one of the eight largest gross creditors. 20 countries even have a remoteness measure of 8.8 or larger in log terms (6,600km).
When we apply the concept of minimum difference in time zones to one of the eight largest creditor countries, we find a large number of countries (55) to exhibit no time zone difference to one of the major creditor countries. The most remote country based on this measure is Japan, followed by Samoa and the United States.
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Weighting the first measure by the inverse of the share of the investments actually received (as described above), reveals a slightly altered picture: Canada is the second least remote country (after Belgium), whereas the most remote countries are Madagascar, Bahrain, and Cambodia.
Using the measure of financial remoteness preferred by Rose and Spiegel (2009) , namely the minimum distance to one of the three major financial centres, reveals Belgium and the Netherlands as being least remote, while Mauritius, Japan, and South Africa are the most remote countries.
In Table 2 , we use Spearman's rank correlations in order to investigate the relation between the different measures of financial remoteness. Crucially, we find a very high correlation coefficient of 0.96 between the concepts based on the distance to the largest creditor countries and the distance to the major financial centres. The coefficient between the distance and time difference measures amounts to 0.46, reflecting a less pronounced relation between the two measures. The rank correlation between the unweighted and weighted minimum distance to one of the eight largest creditor countries is 0.70.
Neighbourliness
We know from the bilateral asset trade literature, that there are further bilateral concepts besides distance that are used as proxies for informational asymmetries. We employ a contiguous dummy, a 'nearby' dummy if the distance between the capitals of two countries is less than 1,000 km, and a currency union dummy. 9 Conceptually, we cannot use straightforward binary dummies like in the bilateral literature, as we carry out the analysis in a unilateral cross-sectional framework. Thus, we start off with a complete bilateral dataset for our country sample and use these concepts in order to construct weighting matrices along the lines of Baicker (2005 (and thus importance) of the various contiguous economies. 12
For the variables described above, we expect a negative sign in the regression analysis as being closer to (or being in a currency union with) a financially very open or net creditor country should facilitate net external funding.
Convergence Clubs
This concept considers the extent of financial and trade linkages of each country with its respective 'core' country, thus the country with which it has the deepest bilateral integration.
This idea goes back to the convergence club concept of Abramovitz (1986) and Baumol (1986) and has been applied to current account patterns of Emerging Asia and Emerging Europe by
Hermann and Winkler (2009).
In order to achieve convergence with a 'leader' country, spillovers are sought by the periphery (catching-up or converging) countries. These spillovers work best through extensive trade and financial linkages with the core (Baumol, 1986) .
Strictly speaking, the concept of convergence clubs applies best to emerging and developing countries, nevertheless we also use the approach for advanced countries as close financial and trade linkages with another country can potentially facilitate capital imports for this group.
We apply this concept by not choosing a core country a priori as done by Hermann and Winkler (that is based on geographic or political considerations), but use three different quantitative concepts. From the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) database, we use the consolidated foreign bank claims on each host country. Thus, the country with the highest level of bank claims is deemed to be the host country's respective core country and we use the actual amount of bank claims (as a ratio to host country GDP) in order to quantify the level of banking integration between the core and the host country. 13 As an alternative measure, we use the bilateral level of total portfolio investments in each host country as given by the IMF's CPIS in order to determine the 'core' country. Equivalently, we employ the level of the core country's portfolio investments in the host country (as a ratio to host country GDP) as an indicator of financial integration with the core. 14 In order to obtain a consistent measure for trade integration, we use the level of bilateral exports from each country to the core based on data from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). 15 We expect more integration with the core to signal lower trade costs, less informational asymmetries and better funding opportunities and thus to be negatively correlated with the net 12 We also experiment with different weighting schemes, for example bilateral asset holdings and bilateral trade and find very similar results. 13 This method reveals that Germany is the 'core' for many European countries (supplemented by Austria for Eastern European countries), the United Kingdom for many Asian countries, France for a lot of African countries, and Spain as well as the United States for Latin American countries.
14 Here, the United States is the core country for the majority of Asian, European, and Latin American countries. 15 For most Asian and Latin American countries, the United States is the largest export market.
external position.
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International Financial Remoteness
We analyse the cross-country variation in the net external position, with a particular focus on the role of the bilateral concepts described in the last section.
First, we present some findings concerning the control variables in order to place the paper in the existing literature on net external positions: GDP per capita exhibits a positive sign throughout the paper which is in line with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a , 2001b . 16 Interestingly, the coefficient is smaller (by about 50% and less significant) for the less developed sample hinting at an even larger correlation for the most advanced countries (compare columns (1) and (2), Table 3 ).
The demographic variables are jointly significant throughout the paper indicating that the demographic structure of a country exerts an important impact on the net external position as also found by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002). We do not report the individual demographic coefficients as introduced in Appendix A2 since they do not have a meaningful interpretation individually, but only jointly as parts of a cubic polynomial. 17 The main findings for the full sample (column 1) are a positive correlation with the net foreign asset position for the age cohorts ranging from 30 to 59, whereas high youth as well as old-age dependency are associated with a lower net external position. The relation for the less advanced sample (based on the findings in column 4) exhibits a peak for the age group between 25 to 29, whereas a negative impact on the net external position sets in for all age groups above the age of 40.
In line with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), we find a significant negative coefficient on the level of public debt throughout the paper. This shows that countries with larger public debt also have larger net foreign liabilities. Thus, we find strong evidence for non-Ricardian behaviour, as high levels of public debt do not seem to be offset by private agents. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) find this result for a subsample of developing countries, whereas we confirm this result both for the full and reduced samples. Interestingly, the coefficient for the less advanced sample is about twice as large as for the full sample which suggests a higher prevalence of non-Ricardian behaviour in emerging and developing countries. 18 In addition, we control for country size and 17 Joint significance of the demographic variables is not found in the estimations presented in columns (2) and (8) of Table 3 . This indicates that the demographic variables are of less importance for less advanced countries once we control for international financial remoteness based on pure distance measures.
18 This is in line with Bussiere, Fratzscher, and Mueller (2006) who show that departures from Ricardian equivalence are especially present in liquidity constrained countries.
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Building on these standard determinants of net external positions, we innovate by including our first bilateral measure: international financial remoteness. We introduce the minimum distance to one of the eight largest international creditor nations. The variable is positive and significant (with a coefficient of 0.093, significant at the 10% level for the full sample (1), and a larger coefficient of 0.146, significant at the 5% level for the reduced sample of less advanced countries (2)). To illustrate this result, were the Slovak Republic in the geographic position of Ukraine (which is equivalent to the Slovak Republic being more remote by 651km), the Slovak Republic's net external position would be less negative by eleven percentage points (that is from -64% of GDP to -53% of GDP), ceteris paribus. By the same token, the estimation implies that were Mexico located in the geographic location of Uruguay its net external position (as a ratio to GDP) would be less negative by 15 percentage points. As an extreme case, had the Czech Republic (one of the least remote countries, see Table 1 ) Argentina's level of remoteness, it would increase its net foreign asset position by about 50 percentage points (that is moving from a net liability position of 35% to a net asset position of 15% (as a ratio to GDP)).
We can infer from this that countries that are more 'financially-remote' tend to have larger net external positions, thus their net foreign liability position is smaller in absolute terms. This relation is stronger for the less advanced, hence natural debtor nations for whom net external funding is more essential. Thus, proximity to major creditor countries facilitates the running of external deficits for emerging and developing economies.
In columns (3) and (4), we modify our remoteness measure by considering the minimum time difference to one of the eight largest gross creditor nations. Here, we find very similar evidence for more remoteness correlating positively with a higher net external position. The coefficient is almost equal in terms of size and significance (at the 5% level) for both the full and less advanced samples. To exemplify the finding of column (3): were Poland (with no time zone difference to one of the eight largest creditor countries) in the location of Russia (with Moscow having a time zone difference of two hours to the closest of the large creditor countries) Poland's net external position would shift from -50% to -36% (as ratios to GDP), ceteris paribus.
In columns (5) and (6), we use the weighted remoteness measure presented in equation (2): in line with the previous results the variable has a positive and significant coefficient (at the 1% level for the less advanced sample). Thus our weighting procedure of distance by actual portfolio holdings, substantiates the previous findings.
Finally, we use the measure of international financial remoteness preferred by Rose and Spiegel (2009): the minimum distance to one of the three world financial centres -London, New York, and Tokyo (columns (7) and (8)). This, for the purpose of our analysis, rather coarse measure, fails to be significant for the full sample, but is significant at the 1% level for the less developed sample. This could be indicative of the fact that less advanced countries are particularly relying on financial interactions with these three most established markets.
On the whole, we can conclude that international financial remoteness is robustly significantly
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April 2011 associated with larger net external positions. This hints at difficulties to receive net external funding for countries that are more 'remote' from world financial activity. We can attribute these net funding problems to the positive correlation between distance and informational asymmetries as well as limited access to international finance. This finding is fortified by the fact that results are stronger for the narrow sample of less advanced countries. Moreover, we give a further potential explanation for external imbalances: next to the well-established fundamental variables determining a country's net external positions, there is a role for the geographic location of a country. We will further explore the geographic dimension in the next subsection.
Neighbourliness
As outlined in Section 3.3.2, we focus on three concepts of neigbourliness: contiguity, nearby countries, and currency unions.
In Table 4 , we examine if de-facto international financial integration, de-jure financial openness, and the net foreign asset position of the respective contiguous countries (weighted by GDP of the contiguous countries) are statistically significant determinants of the net foreign asset position. We find that none of these variables are statistically significant. 19 In Table 5 , we employ a less restrictive concept: we do not focus on contiguous countries, but on all countries where the distance between their capitals is less than 1,000 km. Strikingly, columns (1) and (2) show that financial openness (both de-facto and de-jure) of countries nearby are consistent with a lower net external position. This indicates that being located near financially open countries facilitates net external borrowing. Crucially, this effect is only visible in the full sample, but not for the less advanced countries (columns (4) and (5)). This effect could be driven by European countries that are located very close to each other and also exhibit a high degree of financial integration with each other.
In a similar vein, we examine the role of being part of a currency union for the net external position (Table 6 ). Overall, we observe that both de-facto financial openness as well as larger net external positions of the other currency union members are associated with lower net external positions. Again, this is only observed for the full sample. In particular, the result regarding net foreign assets of the other currency union members is crucial. It implies that being in a currency union with net surplus countries, facilitates net borrowing. Anecdotally, the Euro area fits into this picture, as Germany as a persistent net surplus country invests substantially in net debtor countries such as Greece and Spain.
To conclude, we find an important role for the different concepts of neigbourliness in net external funding, which is foremost driven by the most advanced countries.
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Convergence Clubs
Following Section 3.3.3, we use three different measures to evaluate the respective core country for each economy and the degree of integration with the core. Starting with the level of banking sector claims of the core country (Table 7 , column 1), we find that a higher level of bank claims is associated with a more negative net external position (significant at the 5% level).
This indicates that deeper integration (in terms of the banking sector) with a core economy facilitates net borrowing.
In column (2), we use portfolio investments of the core country. Again, we find a significant negative coefficient (at the 10% level). 20 We do not find evidence for a significant role of more trade linkages (column 3). However, when we control for all three measures at the same time (column 4), the bank claim measure and the trade measure both suggest that financial and trade linkages significantly facilitate net borrowing. Thus, the closer the integration with a core country, the better the access to net external funding.
For the narrow sample of less advanced countries, both the portfolio investment measure and the level of exports to the core country are significantly negative, whereas the banking sector measure just fails to be significant at the 10% level. Nevertheless, when we include all three concepts at the same time (column 8), we obtain the same qualitative results as for the full sample: banking sector integration and trade linkages with the core country make net borrowing easier.
We can conclude, both for the full and less advanced sample, that close financial and trade integration with a 'core' country pays off in terms of improved net borrowing opportunities.
Overall specification
In this subsection, we bring together the different pieces of our analysis so far. In Table 8 , column (1) we employ the baseline estimation (without any bilateral concepts). In column (2), we introduce three bilateral concepts: international financial remoteness (measured by the timezone difference to the top-8 creditor countries), de-facto financial openness of countries nearby, and the level of banking sector claims of the core country.
All of these concepts exhibit the same sign as in the previous subsections and are highly significant. Thus, more remote countries receive less net external funding, whereas being located close to financially open countries and being integrated with the respective core country facilitates net external borrowing. Also the adjusted R 2 increases substantially from column (1) to column (2) which indicates the improved goodness of fit of our new specification.
By the same token, we analyse the less advanced sample. The previously obtained results persist (thus, financial openness of the countries nearby is not significant, whereas financial
ECB Working Paper Series No 1330
remoteness is positive and significant and integration with the core has a significant negative sign).
For both samples, we include de-facto and de-jure international financial openness in order to cross-check if these have an impact on the net external position or the bilateral concepts.
However, only de-facto openness is significant (with a positive coefficient in column (3) for the full sample). Thus our results are robust to the inclusion of these variables.
Decomposition of the net external position
In Table 9 , we decompose the results obtained in Table 8 along two dimensions. First, we divide the net external position into an equity part (portfolio equity and FDI) and a debt part (portfolio and other debt).
For the full sample, we find the financial remoteness indicator to be highly significant for the equity part, but not for the debt component. This could be the result of portfolio equity and in particular FDI being more information-sensitive. 21 In the less advanced sample we find a positive significant coefficient on financial remoteness also for the net debt position.
For the full sample, de-facto financial openness of countries nearby exhibits a positive sign for the equity component, whereas we find a negative sign for the debt component (as in the overall estimations). Banking sector integration with the core only has an impact on the net debt position (both for the full and reduced samples). 22 Second, we distinguish between foreign assets and foreign liabilities: international financial remoteness is significant (at the 1% level) with a negative sign for the total foreign liability position, but has no impact on the foreign asset positions. Consequently, we find additional support for the hypothesis raised in Section 2 that financially-remote countries have difficulties raising (net) external funding, but are able to accumulate assets overseas. This holds for both the full and less advanced samples. The other bilateral variables are not significant for either foreign assets nor liabilities. Thus, their impact works solely through the net position, but not through one of the gross sides.
Conclusion
This paper integrates two major research areas -the analysis of external imbalances and studies of the geographical determinants of cross-border investment. We investigate the role of a country's geographic location for its ability to raise net external funding. 21 For example, Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002) suggest that that FDI is information intensive, leading to problems for FDI investors to raise funding for their investments as they have more knowledge about their investment than outsiders. Theoretically, Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1998) show that FDI investors are endowed with better information than other foreign investors.
22 Strikingly, the demographic structure is only significant for the net debt position.
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We find that geography matters: controlling for standard determinants of net external positions, financially-remote countries exhibit robustly more positive net external positions. This hints at difficulties to receive net external funding for countries that are more 'remote' from the major creditor countries. This finding is even stronger for a narrow sample of less advanced countries.
We also find that being located nearby (and being in a currency union with) financially very open countries, facilitates net external borrowing. In addition, close financial and trade integration with a 'core' country pays off in terms of improved net borrowing opportunities.
Consequently, evidence is found for an important role of geographic and bilateral factors for a country's net external wealth. The determinants of bilateral holdings also affect aggregate gross and net positions: a financially-remote country receives substantially less net external funding.
In line with our theoretical considerations, we find an asymmetry in the way the foreign asset and foreign liability positions are affected by financial remoteness. Financially-remote countries are able to overcome remoteness with regard to investing overseas, whereas inward investments are negatively influenced by a remote geographic location. We attribute this net funding problem to the positive correlation between distance and informational asymmetries as well as limited access to international finance.
For future research, it would be desirable to develop a theoretical model on net external positions and geographic factors that takes the empirical results found in this paper into consideration. 
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A2 Demographic Specification
Our demographic specification follows Fair and Dominguez (1991) and Higgins (1998) , and was introduced as a determinant of net external positions by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002 j=1 α j = 0. We make the restrictions that the coefficients lie along a cubic polynomial
The zero-sum restriction on the coefficients implies that
In turn, we can estimate γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 by introducing the age variables into the specification as
where Notes: The dependent variable is the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP); the explanatory variables are GDP per capita (in natural log form), population (in natural log form), three demographic variables as defined in Appendix A2 (not reported), the ratio of public debt to GDP, the minimum distance to one of the eight largest creditor countries (in natural log form) ( (1) and (2)), the minimum time difference to one of the eight largest creditor countries ( (3) and (4)), the minimum distance to one of the eight largest creditor countries weighted by portfolio holdings ( (5) and (6)), and the minimum distance to one of the three major financial centres (London, New York, and Tokyo) ( (7) and (8)). Cross-sectional estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses). Full sample estimations are reported in (1), (3), (5), and (7); estimations for the sample of non-advanced countries are shown in (2), (4), (6) , and (8 
Notes:
The dependent variable is the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP); the explanatory variables are GDP per capita (in natural log form), population (in natural log form), three demographic variables as defined in Appendix A2 (not reported), the ratio of public debt to GDP, the sum of gross financial assets and liabilities (as a ratio to GDP) of the composite neighbour country ( (1) and (4)), the Chinn-Ito Index of financial openness of the composite neighbour country ( (2) and (5)), and the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP) of the composite neighbour country ( (3) and (6)). Cross-sectional estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses). Full sample estimations are reported in (1)- (3); estimations for the sample of non-advanced countries are shown in (4)- (6) . Wald χ 2 statistic and associated p-value for joint significance of the demographic variables. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
The dependent variable is the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP); the explanatory variables are GDP per capita (in natural log form), population (in natural log form), three demographic variables as defined in Appendix A2 (not reported), the ratio of public debt to GDP, the sum of gross financial assets and liabilities (as a ratio to GDP) of the composite nearby country ( (1) and (4)), the Chinn-Ito Index of financial openness of the composite nearby country ( (2) and (5)), and the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP) of the composite nearby country ( (3) and (6)). Cross-sectional estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses). Full sample estimations are reported in (1)- (3); estimations for the sample of non-advanced countries are shown in (4)- (6) . Wald χ 2 statistic and associated p-value for joint significance of the demographic variables. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Notes:
The dependent variable is the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP); the explanatory variables are GDP per capita (in natural log form), population (in natural log form), three demographic variables as defined in Appendix A2 (not reported), the ratio of public debt to GDP, the sum of gross financial assets and liabilities (as a ratio to GDP) of the composite currency union member country ( (1) and (4)), the Chinn-Ito Index of financial openness of the composite currency union member country ( (2) and (5)), and the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP) of the composite currency union member country ( (3) and (6)). Cross-sectional estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses). Full sample estimations are reported in (1)- (3); estimations for the sample of non-advanced countries are shown in (4)- (6) . Wald χ 2 statistic and associated p-value for joint significance of the demographic variables. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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April 2011 Table 7 : Integration with core Notes: The dependent variable is the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP); the explanatory variables are GDP per capita (in natural log form), population (in natural log form), three demographic variables as defined in Appendix A2 (not reported), the ratio of public debt to GDP, bank claims of the core country (as a ratio to host country GDP) ( (1), (4), (5), and (8)), portfolio assets of the core country (as a ratio to host country GDP) ( (2), (4), (6) , and (8)), and exports to the core country (as a ratio to GDP) ((3), (4), (7), and (8)). Cross-sectional estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses). Full sample estimations are reported in (1)- (4); estimations for the sample of non-advanced countries are shown in (5)- (8) . Wald χ 2 statistic and associated p-value for joint significance of the demographic variables. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
Notes:
The dependent variable is the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP); the explanatory variables are GDP per capita (in natural log form), population (in natural log form), three demographic variables as defined in Appendix A2 (not reported), the ratio of public debt to GDP, the minimum time difference to one of the eight largest creditor countries, the sum of gross financial assets and liabilities (as a ratio to GDP) of the composite nearby country, bank claims of the core country (as a ratio to host country GDP), the sum of gross financial assets and liabilities (as a ratio to GDP) ( (3) and (7)), and the Chinn-Ito Index of financial openness ( (4) and (8)). Cross-sectional estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses). Full sample estimations are reported in (1)- (4); estimations for the sample of non-advanced countries are shown in (5)- (8) . Wald χ 2 statistic and associated p-value for joint significance of the demographic variables. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Notes: The dependent variables are the net foreign equity position (as a ratio to GDP) ( (1) and (5)), the net foreign debt position (as a ratio to GDP) ( (2) and (6)), the gross foreign asset position ((3) and (7)), and the gross foreign liability position ( (4) and (8)), respectively; the explanatory variables are GDP per capita (in natural log form), population (in natural log form), three demographic variables as defined in Appendix A2 (not reported), the ratio of public debt to GDP, the minimum time difference to one of the eight largest creditor countries, the sum of gross financial assets and liabilities (as a ratio to GDP) of the composite nearby country, and the bank claims of the core country (as a ratio to host country GDP). Cross-sectional estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses). Full sample estimations are reported in (1)- (4); estimations for the sample of non-advanced countries are shown in (5)- (8) . Wald χ 2 statistic and associated p-value for joint significance of the demographic variables. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
